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In California Excess Liability Cases, Does
"Bad Faith" In Law Equal "Strict Liability"
In Practice?

Insurance provides an element of security in a world where it
does not exist naturally. Confronted with the possibility of financial loss, many individuals use insurance to help provide financial security. Once a policy of insurance is purchased it becomes
a valuable asset to those protected by it.
It is a matter of common knowledge that a majority of insurance claims are settled without conflict. However, in reference to
those claims which are litigated, the courts play an important
role supervising claims settlements and providing for the resolution of future disputes through the doctrine of stare decisis. In
accomplishing this task of claims supervision the courts must
strike a delicate balance between preserving the insurer's claim
fund against unfounded claims and upholding the reasonable
expectations of policy holders. In an effort to strike this balance,
the California Supreme Court has held that there is an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract of
insurance.1
1. Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d
198, 200 (1958).

Cases involving the breach of the implied convenant of good
faith and fair dealing have come to be known as bad faith cases.
The California courts have not yet formulated a precise definition of the term "bad faith." It has been made clear that bad faith
will be found in cases involving fraud, dishonesty and concealment. 2 It is equally clear that these elements are not necessary to
sustain a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of
3
good faith and fair dealing.
It should be emphasized that the term bad faith does refer to a
specific class of cases involving insurance and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. However, use of this term,
other than as a convenient label for these cases, can be misleading and a source of much confusion. This is because liability is
not necessarily predicated upon a finding of bad faith in the guise
of fraud, dishonesty, concealment, evil, malice or ill will. 4 The

courts have reasoned that liability is impressed upon the insurer
for failing to accept reasonable settlement offers, a duty which is
imposed under the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. 5
The duty of good faith and fair dealing has been held to apply
to all first and third party cases. 6 First party bad faith cases arise
when the insured or his selected beneficiary makes a direct claim
against the insurance company and the company unreasonably

refuses to make payments due and owing under the policy. 7
2. Critz v. Farmers Ins. Group, 230 Cal. App. 2d 788,41 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1965);
Palmer v. Financial Indem. Co., 215 Cal. App. 2d 419,30 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1963); Davy
v. Public National Ins. Co., 181 Cal. App. 3d 387, 5 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1960).
3. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. of New Haven Conn., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 430; 426
P.2d 173, 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16-17 (1967).
4. See Johansen v. California State Auto. Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d
9, 538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975); Cain v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co., 47 Cal. App. 3d 783, 121 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1975); Gruenberg v. Aetna
Insurance Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973); Garner v.
American Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 31 Cal. App. 3d 843, 107 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1973);
Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. of New Haven Conn., 66 Cal. 2d 425,426 P.2d 173,
58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967); Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654,
328 P.2d 198 (1958).

5. Id.
6. Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Company, 9 Cal. 3d 566,573,510 P.2d 1032,
1036, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 486 (1973).
7. Silberg v. California Life Insurance Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452,521 P.2d 1103,113
Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974), for the withholding of payments under a health insurance
policy; Greenberg v. Aetna Insurance Company, 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108
Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973), for the withholding of payments under a fire insurance
policy; Richardson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 232, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 547 (1972), for the withholding of payments under the uninsured motorist
provision of an automobile insurance policy; and Fletcher v. Western National
Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970), for the withholding of
payments under a disability insurance policy.
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Third party bad faith cases arise when the insurer fails to accept
an offer to settle a claim against its insured within liability policy
limits and thereby exposes its insured to excess liability.8 This
article will explore the principles of bad faith as they are applied
to excess liability actions (i.e., third party actions). Although the
jurisdictions have formulated several approaches to this issue,
this article will emphasize the principles adopted by California
courts.9
THE BASIS OF LIABILITY IN EXCESS LIABILITY CASES

Introduction
An insurance company, through the terms of liability insurance policies and subject to the stated limits of liability, promises
to pay all claims which the insured shall become legally obligated
to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property dam-

age. 10 Once a claim for damages is presented for an amount in
excess of the coverage limits an insurance company must decide
whether to meet a demand to settle the claim within the policy
limits or to have the issue and extent of liability determined
through judicial processes. 1 In California, if the insurer elects to
8. See the following cases dealing with the failure to settle claims within
liability policy limits: Johansen v. California State Auto. Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau,
15 Cal. 3d 9, 538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975); Cain v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co., 47 Cal. App. 3d 783,121 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1975); Garner v.
American Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 31 Cal. App. 3d 843, 107 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1973);
Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. of New Haven Conn., 66 Cal. 2d 425,426 P.2d 173,
58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967); and Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 3d
654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
9. For a discussion of the theories of liability for failing to settle, see An.
Insurance Company's Duty to Settle: Qualified orAbsolute? 41 SOUTHERN CAL.
L. REV. 120 (1967-68).
10. The typical insuring clause states that the company will pay, on behalf of
the insured, all sums which an insured shall become legally obligated to pay as
damages because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death at any
time resulting therefrom, sustained by any person. While deceptively simple on('the surface, no less than eight elements must be considered in determining the
extent of coverage provided. These include definitions of property, perils,
hazards, losses, persons, places, time period and the amount of coverage.
11. For consideration of this issue as it's treated outside California, see
General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. Ltd. v. Little, 103 Ariz. 435, 443 P.2d 690
(1968) in which the Arizona Supreme Court noted defense counsel's estimate of
four chances in ten of losing the case; with a possibility of a verdict greatly in
excess of policy limits, these facts created a situation where it was not difficult to
sustain a jury's finding of bad faith. Contra are the following cases, which stand
for the proposition that trial attorneys do not always have the gift of foretelling
the future: American Cas. Co. v. Howard, 187 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1951); Olson v.

litigate the issue of liability or damages and a verdict in excess of
policy limits is rendered, the insurer may be subject to actions for
(1) liability in excess of the policy limits, (2) emotional distress
and (3) punitive damages, all of which would be founded upon a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 2 In
California the implied convenant of good faith and fair dealing
has been held to impose a duty upon the insurer to give equal
13
consideration to the interests of the insured:
When there is great risk of recovery beyond the policy limits so that the
most reasonable manner of disposing of the claim is a settlement which
can be made within those limits, a consideration in good faith of the
insured's interest requires the insurer to settle the claim. Its unwarranted refusal to do so consitutes a breach of the implied convenant of
good faith and fair dealing. 14

The California courts have reasoned that this test is proper
because the insurer has reserved control over the litigation and

settlement of claims and because the insured often receives

15
protection through the settlement of claims without litigation.
The question of whether the insurance company has acted in bad
faith in considering and rejecting the settlement offer is one of
fact to be determined by a jury. 16 As discussed infra,whether the
obligation to accept a reasonable settlement offer has been fulfilled in a particular case is tested, at best, by a vague standard.

Who May Bring The Suit?
Once a judgment in excess of policy limits has been entered
against an insured, an initial consideration is whether a party
other than the insured may bring a bad faith action against the
insurer to recover that excess. The law is well settled in Calif or'nia that the claimant may acquire the insured's cause of action
either through a voluntary assignment from the insured 17 or by
Union Fire Ins. Co., 174 Nebr. 375, 119 N.W.2d 318 (1962); Ferris v. Employers
Mutual Cas. Co., 255 Ia. 511, 122 N.W.2d 263 (1963).
12. See n. 7-8 supra.
13. Johansen v. California State Auto. Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d 9,
16, 538 P.2d 744, 748, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288,292 (1975); Crisci v. Security Insurance Co.
of New Haven, Conn., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 429, 426 P.2d 173, 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16,
(1967); Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654,659,328 P.2d 198,
201 (1958).
14. Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654,659,328 P.2d 198,
201 (1958).
15. Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. of New Haven, Conn., 65 Cal. 2d 425,429,
426 P.2d 173, 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (1967); Comunale v. Traders & General Ins.
Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654,659, 328 P.2d 198,201 (1958); and Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co.,
155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 682, 319 P.2d 69, 71 (1957).
16. Marasango v. Automobile Club of So. Cal., 1 Cal. App. 3d 688,696,82 Cal.
Rptr. 92, 97 (1969).
17. Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 51 Cal. 2d 654,661,328 P.2d 198,
200 (1958).
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taking an assignment from a trustee in bankruptcy. 18 Murphy v.
Allstate InsuranceCompany 19 has recently held that the claimant may not bring a direct action against the insurer without
acquiring an assignment.
Origins Of The Current Test Of Liability
An insurance policy in its basic form is a contract whereby an
insurance company promises to "stand in the shoes" of the
insured when the insured suffers a loss covered by the policy. If a
law suit is filed against its insured, the company has the option to
settle the claim or to defend the action. If it defends the action
and the insured is found liable the company will pay the claim up
to the policy limits that the insured has chosen. 20 This degree of
control over the claim and the ultimate authority to settle or
defend an action is necessary in order to write reasonable rates
that policy holders can afford. This settlement authority, however, must be exercised in good faith.
The procedure whereby the insurer retains complete control
over the settlement of claims, subject to judicial review, incorporates the balance that must be struck between providing protection to policy holders as a group and providing that protection at
reasonable rates. 21 However, this theory does not necessarily
provide a balance between the interests of the insurer and those
of the individual policy holder. Efforts to protect the solvency of
the insurance fund for policy holders as a group might occassionally result in unfair treatment to an individual policy holder.
18. Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 693, 319 P.2d 69, 77
(1957).
19. 17 Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1976).
20. The insuring clause in liability insurance policies is very broad in setting
forth the applicable coverage. However, the coverage provided is subject to
exclusions, conditions, definitions, and limits of liability. The major provisions
over which the insured has control are those which concern the type and amount
of coverage which will'be purchased.
21. If insurance companies are to serve the public efficiently they must
provide coverages at reasonable costs. If insurance is to provide this service to the
public, rates must be adequate to ensure that the claims fund will be adequate to
pay all losses. Improper management, excessive expenses and passive/overgenerous claims philosophies can create insolvency. Likewise, control over claim
settlements is deemed necessary to ensure that solidity will be sustained for the
protection of policy holders as a group.

An attitude too often adopted by less experienced claims
managers is that there is nothing to gain by settling a claim unless
settlement can be obtained for less than policy limits. It is difficult to imagine that, when confronted with a $450,000 suit, an
insurance policy with limits of $10,000, a final demand of $10,000
and the possibility of a final judgment in the amount of $225,000,
the insurer had the interests of the insured in mind when he
offered only $9,500 to settle the claim. 22 This is but one of several
instances that evidences a reluctance on the part of some insurers to offer full policy limits to settle claims. 23 This type of
conduct is difficult to justify even from the insurer's point of
view. In the case above it is doubtful that the insurer would have
offered $9,500 to settle the claim had it not felt that its insured was
legally liable. Yet, in an attempt to save $500, the insurer was
willing to expend a much larger sum of money to defend an
aciton against its' insured. Such claims practices illustrated a
very uneconomical aspect of insurance company operations;
and an examination of the recent cases indicates that this type of
claims conduct has been discontinued. Judicial responses to
these and other similar practices have produced the current test
of "bad faith" in excess liability cases.
This test directs an insurance company to consider the interests
of the insured, analyze the factors surrounding a claim and
requires that, when an offer to settle a claim is received, a
determination whether to settle must be made as if there were no
policy limits. If it is determined that a prudent insurer would
*have accepted an offer of settlement under those conditions, a
breach of the implied convenant of good faith and fair dealing
22. Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968).
23. Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. of New Haven, Conn., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 58
Cal. Rptr. 13, 426 P.2d 173 (1967) where policy limits were $10,000, final demand
was $9,000, a counter-offer of $3,000 was made (the insured was willing to
contribute $2,500) and a judgment for $101,000 was entered; Kinder v. Western

Pioneer Insurance Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 894,42 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1965), where policy
limits were $10,000, final demand was $8,000, a counter-offer of $7,500 was made
and a judgment of $30,000 was entered; Critzv. Farmers Ins. Group, 230 Cal. App.
2d 788, 41 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1964), where the policy limits were $10,000, final demand
was $10,000, a counter-offer of $8,250 was made and a judgment of $40,000 was
entered; Martin v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 228 Cal. App. 2d 178,39 Cal. Rptr.
342 (1964) where policy limits were $10,000, final demand was $10,000, the counteroffer was $9,000 and the judgment was $25,000; Davy v. Public National Ins. Co.,
181 Cal. App. 2d 387, 5 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1960) where policy limits were $5,000, the
final demand was $4,500, the counter-offer was $3,000 (the policy holder was
willing to pay the difference but the lawyer for the insurer said it was against
company policy) and a judgment of $24,268 was entered; Brown v. Guarantee Ins.
Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679,319 P.2d 69 (1957), where policy limits were $5,000, final
demand was $5,000, a counter-offer of $4,000 was made and a judgment of $15,000
was entered.
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will be found if an offer to settle within policy limits has been
24

rejected.

Cases Where Liability Or Damages Are In Issue
An examination of Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. of New
26
Haven, Conn.,25 Garner v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co.
and Cain v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.27 supports
the proposition that, although the doctrine of strict liability in
"bad faith" cases does not exist "at law," it may exist in practice.
California Supreme Court dictum in Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. of New Haven, Conn.28 considered an argument urging
the application of strict liability principles to bad faith cases. The
court noted the arguments made in earlier decisions that the
insured normally receives protection through the settlement of
claims and that the insurer exercises control over claims to the
point that the insured ordinarily cannot compel the insurer to
settle the claim against him.29 The court went on to state that,
when a judgment in excess of policy limits is entered against the
insurer, it is the insured who will be liable for the excess; the
company will be in the same position as if the case had been
settled. Thus, if the insurer fails to settle within policy limits, it
has "gambled" with the insured's money. 30 The court reasoned
that there is some justice in a rule that places the exposure to loss
upon the insurer who "may reap the benefits of its determination
not to settle. '31 Thus, according to dictum in Crisci,even through
an insurer has a litigable issue, if it chooses to defend rather than
32
to settle it does so at its own risk.
24. Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. of New Haven, Conn., 66 Cal. 2d 425,426
P.2d 173, 176, 429, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (1967); Kender v. Western Pioneer Ins. Co.,
231 Cal. Appr. 2d 894, 900, 42 Cal. Rptr. 395, 398 (1965); Critz v. Farmers Ins.
Group, 230 Cal. App. 2d 788,798,41 Cal. Rptr. 401,408 (1964); Martin v. Hartford
Acc. & Indem. Co., 229 Cal. App. 2d 178,183,39 Cal. Rptr. 342,345 (1964); Hodges v.
Standard Accident Ins. Co., 197 Cal. App. 2d 564, 579, 18 Cal. Rptr. 17, 26 (1961);
Davy v. Public National Ins. Co., 181 Cal. App. 2d 387,409, 5 Cal. Rptr. 488, 497
(1960).

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
31 Cal. App. 3d 843, 107 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1973).
47 Cal. App. 3d 783, 121 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1975).
66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
Id. at 430-31, 426 P.2d at 177-78, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
Id.
Id.
In Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Amer., 65 N.J. 474,323

The Crisci court, however, did not deem it necessary to adopt a
theory of strict liability for failure to settle, for it concluded that
the evidence at trial supported the conclusion that the insurer
had breached its duty to consider the interests of the insured
when the company 33
failed to accept an offer to settle the claim
within policy limits.

Also of major significance in Crisci is a jury instruction which
has found approval in the California courts. This instruction, in
effect, provides that a judgment in excess of policy limits furnishes an inference that the most reasonable method of handling
the claim
would have been to settle that claim within the policy
34
limits.

In Garnerv. American Mutual Liability Ins. Co.35 a malprac-

tice insurance policy was issued to the insured with liability
limits of $100,000. The terms of the policy provided that the
company "shall not settle or compromise any claim or suit [for
malpractice] without the consent ' 36 of a medical review board.
On two separate occasions the medical review board concluded
A.2d 495 (1974) the N.J. Supreme Court recognized the dictum in Crisci that
supported a rule of strict liability for failing to settle. The California Supreme
Court in Johansen v. California State Auto Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau, 14 Cal. 3d 9,
538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975), added additional emphasis to its dictum in
Crisci. In Johansen at note 6 the court states that the N.J. Supreme Court had
adopted the strict liability rule in Rova Farms. A reading of Rova Farms discloses that the N.J. Supreme Court discussed in dicta (quoting the Crisci dictum
on strict liability) whether to adopt a rule of strict liability for failing to settle. The
N.J. Supreme Court, however, decided that it was unnecessary to adopt such "an
,extended rule" to decide the case. 65 N.J. at 502,323 A.2d at 510. The N.J. Supreme
Court, however, in note 9 to its opinion, indicates a willingness to adopt the strict
liability rule:
[T]here is no constitutional mandate that a court may not go beyond
[..
what is necessary to decide a case at hand. Whether an issue will be dealt
with narrowly or expansively calls for a judge's evaluation of many
things, including the need for guidance for the bar or agencies of
government or the general public. To that end, the Court may express
doubts upon existing doctrines. . . 65 N.J. at 502, n.9,323 A.2d at 510, n.9.
Johansen appears once again to state the California Supreme Court's favorable
position toward a principle of strict liability and a willingness to adopt it in a
proper case.
33. 66 Cal. 2d at 431-32, 426 P.2d at 177-78, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17-18.
34. The size of the judgment recovered in the personal injury action
when it exceeds the policy limits, although not conclusive, furnished an
inference that the value of the claim is the equivalent of the amount of
the judgment and that acceptance of an offer within those limits was the
most reasonable method of dealing with the claim.
Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. of New Haven, Conn., 66 Cal. 2d 425,431,426 P.2d
173, 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 17 (1967); Accord Johansen v. California State Auto.
Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d 9, 17, 538 P.2d 744, 749, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288, 293
(1975); Cain v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 47 Cal. App. 3d 783,
796-97, 121 Cal. Rptr. 200, 208-09 (1975).
35. 31 Cal. App. 3d 843, 107 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1973).
36. Id. at 846, 107 Cal. Rptr. 606.
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that there was no malpractice on the part of the insured physician with respect to a single claim.37 There was a demand for the
policy limits but, due to the findings of the medical review board
and the terms of the policy, the demand was not accepted even
though the insured had requested that settlement be made. The
trial verdict was for $225,000, $125,000 over the policy limits.
In a suit for the excess judgment, the trial court found that the
insurance company was not permitted by the terms of the policy
to settle the case without the approval of the medical review
board and found for the defendant. This finding was not contested by the plaintiff on appeal and the court of appeal accepted
it. However, the appellate court reversed the judgment in favor
of the defendant, concluding that the insurer was liable for the
excess judgment of $125,000 notwithstanding the policy term
prohibiting settlement without the medical review board's
concurrence.
In support of this holding, the appellate court reasoned that
there are many factors which must be considered by the insurance company in determining whether to settle a case.3 8 Further,
37. Under most liability policies the insurance company has full control over
the settlement of claims. In malpractice insurance it is common to have a
provision in the policy to the effect that settlement of a suit or claim cannot be
made without the consent of the insured. One rationale for this clause is that the
doctor's reputation is involved. In this case, the decision rested with the medical
review board. This type of provision provides the insurer with sound independent medical advice as to whether malpractice exists.
38. 31 Cal. App. 3d at 849-50, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
Since the ultimate determination of the risk and exposure of plaintiff
was vested in 12 lay jurors in a courtroom, the obligation to protect
plaintiff also included, of necessity, a careful measuring of the legal
facets of the case, the probabilities of a verdict and its anticipated range
if adverse, the strengths and weaknesses of all of the evidence to be
presented on either side so far as known, the nature of the surgical or
medical result, the experience and capacity of counsel, and the history
of the particular jurisdiction in similar litigation. Finally, defendant
owed to plaintiff its experience and expertise in total claims evaluation
as an insurance company. In assessing plaintiff's exposure, it may not
ignore its own claims assessment based upon its experience in the given
geographic area with cases of similar nature and with similar medical
results, if any. It must fairly and reasonably appraise and weigh a
number of determinative factors including such ponderables as the
relative appearance and likely appeal or the lack thereof, of the claimant
and its insured, as well as the known witnesses, together with the
seriousness of the medical result. In short, it must bring to bear on the
case on behalf of its insured an amalgam of medical, legal and claims
judgments which dictate the course, nature and intensity of any pretrial
settlement negotiations. In such a composite of judgments it may not
ignore the desires or instructions of the insured, for in the final analysis
the exposure, the ultimate risk of loss, is his.

it found that the insurer, in considering the interests of the
insured, had failed to make an independent evaluation of the
claim.3 9
This case demonstrates that proof of "bad faith" in the sense of
fraud, dishonesty, concealment, evil, malice or ill will is not
necessary to sustain an action for breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.40 An examination of the court's
decision reveals that the only basis for the compensatory award
was the insurer's failure to make an independent determination
of liability, an omission which was construed as a failure to
consider the interests of the insured. It is apparent, even from the
opinion of the court that the insurer acted in good faith by
adhering to the terms of the policy and submitting the malpractice issue to an independent medical review board, not once,
but twice. Had the medical review board concluded that there
was malpractice and had the insurer disregarded its opinion, the
court's decision would have been supported to the extent that the
insurer had failed to give equal consideration to the insured's
interest and that it had likewise acted in traditional "bad faith."
The insurance company erred in this case when it placed its
settlement authority solely upon the decision of the medical
review board. Insurance companies and their employees are
generally not experts in the field of medicine, but medical review
boards comprised of licensed doctors usually are. Insurance
companies, as a portion of the overall settlement process, must
be allowed to rely on the opinions of medical review boards in
order to make educated determinations of malpractice. But they
must proceed further. They must also consider the numerous
other factors involved in any negligence action including for
example, whether trial will be to the court or to the jury, the
experience and capacity of counsel for plaintiff and defendant,
the strengths and weaknesses of witnesses and of the evidence,
the seriousness of the injuries, the probability of a verdict for the
plaintiff, the verdict potential, the likelihood of appeal, and the
prior decisions on this subject of the jurisdiction selected. 41
In Cain v. State FarmMutualAutomobile Insurance Co.42 the

only bad faith issue before the court was whether State Farm had
given equal consideration to the interests of its insured. It was
agreed that State Farm had conducted a thorough investigation
of the claim, had kept its insured informed of all settlement
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 849, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
Id. at 851, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
31 Cal. App. 3d at 849-50, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
47 Cal. App. 3d 782, 121 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1975).
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offers and had retained "experienced counsel. '43 Thus, a finding
that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing had been
breached could be based only upon the ground that the insurer
failed to give equal consideration to the interests of the insured.
On August 11, 1964, Bing Woo Jew (State Farm's insured) and
Elaine Cain were involved in a one-car accident. 4 Elaine Cain
sued Bing Woo Jew for the injuries she received as a result of the
accident. There was a dispute as to whether Elaine Cain or Bing
Woo Jew was driving the vehicle. If Elaine Cain was the driver of
the vehicle at the time of her injury, then her injury
would have
45
been the proximate result of her own actions.
The facts adduced at trial would have supported a finding in
favor of either party on this issue.
The facts most favorable to the plaintiff revealed that
At the scene of the accident, Jew told the police officer that he had been
driving, to keep Elaine Cain's name out of the police report, to protect
his marriage. . . . Subsequently, in the early morning hours after the
accident, while defendant, Jew, and the police officer were at the
hospital, Jew changed the story and told the police officer that he had
not been driving and in fact Elaine Cain was the driver of the fated
vehicle. . . [aifter he was told that Elaine Cain could possibly die from
the critical injuries that she sustained and the case could possible
involve a manslaughter charge ....
The windshield of the vehicle was
broken on the right side, generally in front of the passenger's seat, yet
Jew sustained no severe head injuries, but for some minor cuts from
splintering glass. . . . Yet Elaine Cain had a depressed skull fracture
on the right side of her head, . . . [t]hat the right side of the vehicle,
including the front door window and windshielf were blood-spattered
and that Jew had not received any head injuries or serious bleeding...
[t]hat Mr. Snedden [the ambulance attendant]. . . found the girl mainly
in the center toward the right passenger side of the front seat and
remembered that she had severe injuries to the right side of her head.4 6

The facts most favorable to the defense revealed that
In this third recorded statement, Jew again reiterated and represented
to State Farm that Cain was the driver of the vehicle ....
It was
reported to State Farm by a private investigator that "Olsen [the
investigating police officer] considered that Woo's subsequent story
that the girl had been driving was true and he cancelled the citation that
had already been made out to Woo and prepared the Official Reort
indicating that Miss Cain had been driving the car."
43. Id. at 791-92, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 205.
44. Brief for Appellant, 1-2, Cain v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 47 Cal. App. 3d 783, 121 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1975).
45. Id. at 4.
46. Brief for Respondents, 1-11, Cain v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co., 47 Cal. App. 3d 783, 121 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1975).

Olsen had telephoned Harbor Emergency Hospital and spoke to ambulance steward Marks, who had removed the victim from the scene....
Marks told Olsen that the girl's hips and legs had been under the
steering wheel of the vehicle, the upper torso of her body to the right
across the center of the front seat of the vehicle and her head and
shoulders resting in the lap of a male passenger who was seated on the
right portion of the front seat, there being no evidence that this had not
been the original position of the occupants of the vehicle because the
right door-the passenger's door-had been involved in the collision
with the pole and the ambulance personnel could not visualize how the
male occupant could have gotten himself handily into the
47 position in
which they found him had he not been there originally.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for almost
$58,000 and the insurer paid the policy limits of $25,000. At this
time Bing Woo Jew assigned his cause of action against State
Farm for the excess judgment to Elaine Cain and reserved to
himself any cause of action for physical injuries sustained as a
result of the failure to settle. Elaine Cain and Bing Woo Jew
jointly brought the action in issue against State Farm. The jury
returned a verdict for the amount of the excess in favor of Elaine
Cain and awarded $25,000 in compensatory damages and
48
$115,000 in punitive damages to Bing Woo Jew.
The issue confronting the appellate court in Cain may be
stated in this manner: in considering the interests of the insured,
may the insurer defend an action if there is a reasonably founded
factual dispute as to liability and then not be held liable for the
excess if it loses the case? On the basis of the decision in this case,
the answer is no.
There was no dispute that the insurer had an opportunity to
settle the claim within policy limits. Thus, to determine whether
the insurer had acted in violation of the implied covenant of good
faith the test applied was "whether a prudent insurer without
'49
policy limits would have accepted the settlement offer.
In Merrittv. Reserve InsuranceCompany ° the court stated in
dicta that "the carrier is not required to predict at its' peril the
outcome of the suit, or the credibility of the witnesses."' 51 It has
been stated that
The gift of prophesy has never been bestowed on ordinary mortals, and
as yet their vision has not reached a state of perfection that they have
the power to predict what will
be the verdict of a jury on disputed facts
52
in a personal injury case.
47. Brief for Appellant, 4-7, Cain v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 47 Cal. App. 3d 783, 121 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1975).
48. 47 Cal. App. 3d at 789-90, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 204.
49. 47 Cal. App. 3d at 792, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 205.
50. 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1973).
51. Id. at 874, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
52. Georgia Cas. Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 46 S.W.2d 777 (1932).
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In Cain, the issue of liability was in dispute and the credibility of
the insured as a witness was in issue. Cainholds that an insurer is
responsible for judging the credibility of witnesses and predicting the outcome of a suit.5 3 This decision requires the insurer to

'second-guess" twelve jurors and to determine in advance how
and in what manner they will react to a given set of facts. The
Cain Court referred to the expertise of the claims department of
the insurer 54 and concluded that, in applying that expertise to the
evaluation and negotiation of claims, the insurer knew or should
have known what the final results were going to be.
Whether a prudent insurer should have settled a case within
policy limits can easily be determined by hindsight. In any case
where there exists a reasonable factual dispute concerning liability or damages an insurance company must, under this decision,
proceed at its peril. When an insurance company considers the
interests of its insured it will always be in the best interests of the
insured to settle the claim.
As stated in Crisci,the insurer who defends an excess liability
case has nothing to lose except the costs of litigation and everything to gain should it win the case. The insured, on the other
hand, has nothing to gain by non-settlement of the claim within
policy limits. The jury must decide whether the insurance company has given equal consideration to the interests of the insured.5 5 However, a decision against the insurance company
becomes even more likely in a suit for an excess judgment when
the judge instructs the jury that the amount of the judgment
provides an inference that the most reasonable method of dealing with the claim would have been to accept the settlement
demand.
Excess Liability Cases Where Policy Coverage Is In Issue
The California Supreme Court in Comunale v. Traders and
GeneralIns. Co. ,56 considered the effect of a disclaimer of coverage by the insurer. Here, the insurer had not only denied coverage but had also refused to defend the insured. The Court's
reasoning was persuasive with regard to its finding of liability:
53.
54.
55.
56.

47 Cal. App. 3d at 790-91, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 204.
47 Cal. App. 3d at 790-91, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 204-05.
Id. at 791-92, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 206.
50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d at 198 (1958).

where an insurer denies coverage and fails to defend the insured
it should be placed in no better position than if it had assumed the
defense and then declined to settle.5 The Comunale decision is
partially responsible for the current practice in the insurance
industry of offering the insured a defense under a "nonwaiver
and withhold payment of the claim until the coverage question
can be resolved" format. As will be seen infra, the decision in
Johansenv. CaliforniaState Auto Assn. Inter-Ins.Bureau5 8 has
made this practice obsolete in excess liability cases. Further it
has been held that reasonable attorney's fees are recoverable
where the insurer has caused the insured to seek counsel to
59
protect his interests.
In Johansen the court considered the effect of a disclaimer of
coverage by the insurer. In that case the policy limits were
$10,000, there was a demand of $10,000 and a verdict of $34,000.
The insurer's reason for not accepting the settlement demand
was based upon a belief that the policy did not provide coverage.
The insurer defended the insured in the personal injury action
but reserved the right to litigate the coverage question.
In the declaratory relief action 60 the insurer contended that the
insured had not reported a newly acquired vehicle within thirty
days as required by the policy. The trial court ruled in favor of
the insurer on this issue. This decision was reversed on appeal
but not until

31/2

years after the plaintiff had obtained the $34,000

verdict in the personal injury action. 61 In an action for the
amount of the excess judgment, the California Supreme Court
reversed the holdings of the trial and appellate courts and found
the carrier liable for the excess judgment.
In support of its holding, the court reaffirmed the principle that
there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
every insurance contract which imposes a duty upon the insurer
to settle a claim when recovery in excess of policy limits is
57. Id. at 660, 328 P.2d at 202.
58. 15 Cal. 3d 9, 538 P.2d 750, 123 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1975).
59. See Mustachio v. Ohio Farmers Insurance Company, 44 Cal. App. 3d 358,
118 Cal. Rptr. 581 (1975), where the court in a first party action held that attorney's
fees are recoverable from an insurer who has breached the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing and thereby caused the insured to seek the aid of
counsel to protect his interests.
Since at least 1910 Georgia has allowed an award of attorney's fees where the
insurer has acted in bad faith, has been stubbornly litigious or has caused the
insured unnecessary trouble and expense. See State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Smoot, 381 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1967), a case in which $21,929.20 was
awarded as reasonable attorney fees.
60. Cal. State Auto Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Dearing, 259 Cal. App. 2d 717,
66 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1968).
61. Id.
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likely; 62 that an insurer litigates a coverage question at its own
risk; 63 and that an insurer's "good faith through erroneous belief
in non-coverage affords no defense to liabilityflowing from the
insurer'sfailure to accept a reasonablesettlement offer; ' 64 that
the insurer must conduct negotiations as though there were no
policy limits; 65 that there is an inference that the value of the
claim is equivalent to the amount of the judgment and that
settlement would be the most reasonable method of handling the
claim; 66 and that liability is not based on a refusal to defend but is
based rather on "the refusal to accept an offer of settlement
67
within policy limits.In Johansen the insurer contended that the principle announced by the court would require an insurer to settle in all
cases, regardless of whether the policy provided coverage, to
protect itself from exposure to excess liability should the coverage question be decided in favor of the insured.6 8 The court's
position that the insurer can seek reimbursement from the insured is theoretically sound. However, it is questionable as to
how many "insureds" will possess sufficient assets to satisfy
claims for reimbursement.
Thus, the only permissible consideration in evaluating the
reasonableness of the settlement offer becomes whether, in light
of the victim's injuries and the probable liability of the insured,
the ultimate judgment is likely to exceed the amount of the
settlement offer. Such factors as the limits imposed by the policy,
a desire to reduce the amount of future settlements or a belief
that the policy does not provide coverage should not affect a
decision as to whether the settlement offer in question is a
69
reasonable one.
62. Johansen v. California State Auto. Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d 9,
14, 15, 538 P.2d 744, 747, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288, 291 (1975).
63. Id. at 15, 538 P.2d at 748, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
An insurer who denies coverage does so at its own risk and although its
position may not have been entirely groundless, if the denial is found to
be wrongful, it is liable for the full amount which will compensate the
insured for all the detriment caused by the insurer's breach of the
express and implied obligation of the contract.
64. Id. at 16, 538 P.2d at 748, 123 Cal. Rptr. 25, 292. (Emphasis added)
65. Id.
66. Id. at 17, 538 P.2d at 749, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 19, 538 P.2d at 750, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 294.
69. Id. at 16, 538 P.2d at 748-49, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 292-93.

Together these excess liability cases yield the principle that the
"reasonable expectations"7 of policy holders include the expectations that, when the opportunity to settle within policy limits

without prejudice to the insured,7 is presented, the insurer will
settle the claim or be liable for the full amount of any judgment in
excess of the policy limits.
Is There An Affirmative Duty To Seek Settlement?

Although it is clear that an insurer may subject itself to liability
beyond the policy limits by failing to accept a demand within
those limits, it remains to be conclusively determined whether a
California insurer has an affirmative duty to negotiate a settlement within the policy limits. Courts in other jurisdictions have
concluded that insurance companies may be held liable for excess judgments even though demands for settlement have not
been made. 72 These cases have placed affirmative fiduciary
duties upon the insurers which required them to initiate settlements. To avoid liability these insurers must show that it was not
possible to obtain settlements within policy limits and that settlements could not be achieved through contributions, by their
insureds, of the excess amounts.
The California courts have not yet imposed this duty upon
insurance companies. In Merritt v. Reserve Insurance Company73 the court considered the bad faith issue as it related to a
conflict of interest between the insurance company and the
insured. The court determined that as long as settlement within
70. The following language from a'first party action provides:
In determining what benefits or duties an insurer owes his insured
pursuant to a contract of title insurance, the court may not look to the
words of the policy alone, but must also consider the reasonable expectations of the public and the insured as to the type of service which the
insurance entity holds itself out as ready to offer. Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Insurance Company, 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 942, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 470, 487 (1975).
71. In the excess liability cases discussed supra, the basis of liability has
turned on the issue of whether the insurance company had given equal consideration to the interests of the insured. In Coe v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co., (lst Dist., Civ. No. 37977 decided Feb. 9,1977), the court reversed a
lower court decision finding the insurer guilty of bad faith in failing to accept a
settlement offer. State Farm rejected the offer because it failed to make any
provision for consent or participation by another insurance company. Acceptance of the offer as postulated would have left the insured open to a recoupment
action by the other insurance company. The court held that it cannot be bad faith
to reject an offer whose terms would themselves represent bad faith.
72. Cernocky v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of No. Amer., 69 Ill. App. 2d 196, 216
N.E.2d 198 (1966); State Auto Ins. Co. of Columbus, Ohio v. Rowland, 221 Tenn.
421, 427 S.W.2d 30 (1968); Self v. Allstate Ins. Co., 345 F. Supp. 191 (1972). Rova
Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Amer., 65 N.J. 474,323 A.2d 495 (1974).
73. 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1973).
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policy limits was not feasible the interests of the insured and the
company were the same, i.e., that of defending the action. An
examination of the facts in Merrittmakes it clear that settlement
within policy limits was not feasible whether the insured contributed his own assets or not. No demand for settlement was ever
made and the insurer and its counsel did not forsee any possibility of settlement. The court therefore reasoned that a conflict of
interest had never developed between the insured and his insurer
and that the situation was one in which an issue of bad faith had
74
not arisen.
It is to be noted that Merritt should not be cited for the
proposition that an insurer does not have a duty to promote
settlements. The facts of this case present a rare situation. Where
settlement within policy limits would be feasible, a duty to promote settlement will probably be found to exist, especially when
the insured has made a demand that the company make an offer
of settlement within the policy limits. It is also doubtful that an
insurer could avoid liability for an excess judgment by merely
arguing that no settlement demand had been made by the insured or by the plaintiff.
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES IN BAD FAITH CASES

In a bad faith action, either first party or third party, 75 the
insured apparently has two options for seeking recovery for
emotional distress.
If the conduct by the insurance company may be categorized as
"outrageous and extreme,"7 6 the insured may bring an action
74. Id. The insurance policy limit was $100,000 and the suit was for $650,000.
There was a workmen's compensation lien against any recovery by Merritt.
$76,000 had already been paid under workmen's compensation and a reserve had
been established in the amount of $145,000 for future payments. The insured's net
worth prior to trial was approximately $40,000 and at trial Merritt received a
verdict in the amount of $434,000.
75. Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. of New Haven, Conn., 66 Cal. 2d 425,426
P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967); Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Company, 9 Cal.
3d 666, 510 P.2d 1032, 105 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).

76. For a complete discussion on good faith and first party claims, see Good
Faithand FairDealing in Insurance Contracts;Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance
Co., 24 HASTINGs L.J. 699 (1974); and Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470
F.2d 1, 4-5 (7th Cir. 1972). In Eckenrode the court supported a decision concerning
the proceeds of a life insurance contract by reasoning that
Peace of mind is a personal interest of sufficient importance to receive
the law's protection against intentional invasion by outrageous conduct

based on the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress."
However, in California, it is clear that an award of damages for
emotional distress need not be based on this theory, but may be
based upon emotional distess as a compensatory
damage flow78
ing from the commission of another tort.
The rule, most recently affirmed in Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.79 is that if a bad faith cause of action is otherwise

established, damages may be given for mental suffering naturalry ensuing from the acts complained of and that without attempting to distinguish between pain on the one hand and suffering on
the other, the term"pain and suffering" includes recovery for
fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, mortification, shock,
humiliation, indignity, embarrassment, apprehension, terror, or
ordeal. 80 Admittedly, these terms describe subjective states in
the insured and represent a damage which often can be translated into a monetary recovery only with difficulty.81
The absence of expert medical testimony will not itself prevent
recovery for emotional distress. Commonly, the plaintiff's own
testimony establishes the damage. 82 Even in the absence of any
explicit evidence showing "pain and suffering," the jury may
• . .outrageous character of a person's conduct may arise from an abuse
by that person of a position which gives him power to affect the interests
of another; and that in this sense extreme bullying tactics and other high
pressure methods of insurance adjusters seeking to force compromises
or settlements may constitute outrageous conduct. . . insurer's alleged
bad faith refusal to make payment on the policy, coupled with its
deliberate use of economic coercion to force a settlement, clearly rises to
the level of outrageous conduct to a person of ordinary sensibilities...
the very risks insured against presuppose that upon the death of the
insured the beneficiary might be in difficult circumstances and thus
particularly susceptible and vulnerable to high pressure tactics by an
economically powerful entity.
See also, Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 90
Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
77. State Rubbish Etc. Assn. v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952).
The elements of a prima facie case for the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress are:
1) outrageous conduct by the defendant;
2) the defendant's intention of causing or reckless disregard of the
probability of causing emotional distress;
3) the plaintiff's suffering severe or emotional distress; and
4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the
defendant's outrageous conduct.
See also, Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376,
394, 90 Cal. Rptr. 78, 88 (1970).
78. Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. of New Haven, Conn., 66 Cal. 2d 425,432,
425 P.2d 173, 178, 48 Cal. Rptr. 13, 18 (1967).
79. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
80. Id. See also Caplouto v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 7 Cal. 3d 889,

892-93, 500 P.2d 880, 883, 103 Cal. Rptr. 856, 859 (1972).
81. Caplouto v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 7 Cal. 3d 889,893,500 P.2d 880,
883, 103 Cal. Rptr. 856, 859 (1972).
82. Id. at 895, 500 P.2d at 884-85, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61.
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infer such pain, if the jury in its common experience knows that
the injury complained of normally is accompanied by such
pain.8 3 Courts have also allowed damages for mental suffering
where there were no personal injuries, apart from the mental
distress, the only injury being an interference with property
rights.8 4 The facts in the bad faith cases which awarded compensatory damages for emotional distress, indicated an independent
injury such as demonstrable decline in physical health, 8 or
actual pecuniary loss. 8 6 In Crisci, the court reasoned that the
existence of these "other damages" provide the court with a
sufficient guarantee of the genuineness of the claim to mitigate
87
the danger of ficticious claims.
In Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co.88 the court of appeal articulated the rule as
[T]he [Crisci] court was attempting to resolve the fundamental jurisprudential conflict engendered by the "impact or injury" rule. To
ascertain the genuiness of a claim the court decided to look to the facts
of the case to determine whether plaintiff had suffered an empirically
verifiable injury: a'detriment whose impact was readily observable
and identifiable; an injury which could not be easily fabricated as
mental distress, since proof of it could, and should be drawn from
sources other than the plaintiff's own mouth. Thus, if a complaint
indicates (for example) that a plaintiff was deprived of the use of his
real property or his financial resources; or suffered physical injury; or
was deprived of the possession of a piece of personalty, he may reasonably have been said to have suffered substantial damages. Sufferance
of injuries such as these permit the reasonable inference that plaintiff's claim of mental distress is genuine.8 9

The foregoing discussion would indicate that recovery for
emotional distress is predicated upon proof of three elements;
proof of the tort, a showing of some "other damage" and "some
evidence" of the plaintiff's emotional distress causually connected to the tort.90
83. Id. at 896, 500 P.2d at 885, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
84. Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. of New Haven, Conn., 66 Cal. 2d 425,426
P.2d 173, 45 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967) and cases cited therein.
85. Id. at 429, 426 P.2d 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. 16.
86. Id. at 429, 426 P.2d 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. 16; Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance
Company, 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973); Jarchow v.
Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1975).
87. Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. of New Haven, Conn., 66 Cal. 2d 425,434,
426 P.2d 173, 179, 48 Cal. Rptr. 19 (1967).
88. 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1975).
89. Id. at 936, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 484.
90. Supra, notes 85-89. See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333 (West 1970) which
states the general rule of damages in tort, that the insured party may recover an

In Cainv. State FarmMutual Automobile InsuranceCo. ,91 the
court of appeal affirmed an award of $25,000 compensatory

damages for emotional distress in favor of State Farm's insured,
Bing Woo Jew. In reaching it's decision, the court reviewed only
the evidence supporting the finding of a breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. By failing to state the
evidence in the record sustaining a finding of emotional distress 92 and by failing to analyze this evidence in relation to the
rules of law pertaining to recovery for emotional distress, 93 the
Cain court appears to accept the proposition that no proof other
than proof of the tort is required to support an award of compen94
satory damages for emotional distress.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN BAD FAITH CASES

It is not the purpose of this paper to present an exhaustive
discussion of the issue of exemplary damages; however, an ex-

amination of the subject is in order since Cain was the first
California case to award punitive damages in an excess liability
case.
In Cain, an award of punitive damages in the amount of
$115,000 was sustained. 95 The court held that the insurer had
tortiously breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
by its wrongful refusal to settle within policy limits and96by failing to
give equal consideration to the interests of the insured.

The court further held that the insurer had acted with a conamount which will compensate him for all the detriment proximately caused,
whether it could have been anticipated or not.
91. 47 Cal. App. 3d 783, 121 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1975).
92. In the section of its opinion entitled "Sufficiency of the Evidence as to the
Awards of Compensatory Damages" the court characterizes State Farm's contention as "[The verdict] should be reversed on the grounds that there is insufficient evidence to support a finding of bad faith." The remaining portion of the
discussion in that section is devoted to reviewing the evidence which establishes
the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
A review of the appellant's brief and respondent's brief, however, discloses that
the issue joined on the appeal could be fairly characterized as-given the breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, is there sufficient evidence of
emotional distress to support an award of $25,000 compensatory damages?
Apparently there is many a slip twixt cup and lip. Brief for appellant at 22, Cain v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 47 Cal. App. 3d 783, 121 Cal. Rptr.
200 (1975). Brief for respondent at 30, Cain v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co., 47 Cal. App. 3d 783, 121 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1975).
93. Compare the discussion in Cain,47 Cal. App. 3d at 791-92, 121 Cal. Rptr.
at 205-06 with the discussion of emotional distress damages in Crisci and
Gruenberg, note 75 supra and Jarchow, n.88 supra.
94. See note 92 supra.
95. Cain v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 47 Cal. App. 3d
783, 790, 121 Cal. Rptr. 200, 204 (1975).
96. Id. at 794, 121 Cal. Rptr, at 207.
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scious disregard of the insured's interests in that State Farm
Insurance Company had
...after the verdict in Cain v. Jew ... refused to accept any responsibility for the excess amount, and contrary to advise of their own
counsel, rejected an offer to settle the excess verdict for $55,000 even
though they were aware that their insured's personal assets would be
wiped out without satisfying the excess verdict, thereby forcing him
into bankruptcy ...that the relationship between the insured Jew and
Miss Cain would be exposed resulting in the possible termination of
Jew's marriage. 97

According to the Cain court, State Farm demonstrated a conscious disregard of the insured's rights when it refused to accept
a post judgment settlement offer, contrary to the advice of attorney Robert A. Seligson. This recommendation to settle was contained in correspondence referred to by the court as the "Seligson Letter," to the insurance company from attorney Robert A.
Seligson a member of the firm retained by State Farm to represent the defendant in the Cain v. Jew suit, which was written
shortly after the verdict had been returned against the insured.
In the letter, Mr. Seligson advised State Farm to settle the
excess claim, basing his opinion on "quoted excerpts from the
Cmisci opinion." 98 The Cain trial court in admitting the letter into
evidence admonished the jury that the letter contained dictum
(such as strict liability for failure to settle) and that it did not
reflect the current state of the law. 99
Yet the Cain court appears to place great emphasis upon the
insurance company's failure to follow Mr. Seligson's advice to
settle, even though his recommendation was based on the strict
liability dictum from Crisci.100 Under current California law
recovery of the excess is not based on strict liability, but rather on
the tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. 10 Therefore, if an excess verdict is returned, the insured
has no automatic right to payment of the excess by the insurance
company. Before the right to payment arises, the insured must
prove this tortious breach. Admittedly, as a general point of law a
legal right may be exercised in a manner which would support an
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id. at 798, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
Id.
Id. at 794, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 207.
See note 33 and accompanying text supra.

award of punitive damages.0 2 However, the court fails to clearly
delineate how State Farm's decision to put the plaintiff to the test
of proving the tortious breach was an act in "conscious disregard"' 3 of the plaintiff's rights. The court in its punitive damage
discussion states
Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly discuss the issue of
punitive damages. . . the major thrust of the Gruenbergholding is that
such action on the partof insurerswill not be tolerated and a breach of
...[the covenant] of good faith and fair dealing will
10 4 lead the imprudent
insurer down the path of exemplary damages.
102. "Callous disregard of whether a legal act will harm another equates with
a calculated intent to exercise a legal right irrespective of its consequences."
Farmy v. College Housing Inc., 48 Cal. App. 3d 166 at 176 n.3,121 Cal. Rptr. 658 at
665 n.3 (1975).
103. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1970) provides that
In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract,
where the defendant has been guilty of oppression,fraud, or malice,
express or implied,the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may
recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the
defendant. (Emphasis added.) The cases interpreting section 3294 make
it clear that in order to warrant the allowance of punitive damages the
act complained of must not only be wilful in the sense of intentional, but
it must also be accompanied by aggravating circumstances, amounting
to malice. The malice required implies an act conceived in a spirit of
mischief or with criminal indifference towards the obligations owed to
others. There must be an intent to vex, annoy or injure. Mere spite or ill
will is not sufficient; and mere negligence, even gross negligence is not
sufficient to justify an award of punitive damages. Ebaugh v. Rabkin, 22
Cal. App. 3d 891, 894, 99 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1972), and cases cited therein.
Actual malice must be shown in order for punitive damages to be
awarded, but this malice, including malicious intent, may be inferred
from the circumstances of the case... "Oppression" has a well established meaning. It means subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of his rights. Richardson v. Employers Liab.
Assur. Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 232, 245-46, 102 Cal. Rptr. 547, 566 (1972),
and cases cited therein.
As between oppression and malice, there must be some evidence of one
or the other of these elements to justify the jury in making the award. It
follows that a tort committed by mistake, in the assertion of a supposed
right, or without any wrong intention, and without such recklessness as
evinces malice or a conscious disregard of the rights of others, does not
warrant punitive damages. . .The only question is whether or not a jury
might rightfully draw an inference from the evidence produced that
there was a conscious disregard for the rights of others which constituted an act of subjecting plaintiffs to cruel and unjust hardship. In all
classes and kinds of cases in which exemplary damages are sanctioned,
there must be made to appear to the satisfacion of the jury the evil
motive, the animus malus, shown by malice in fact or by its allied malign
traits and characteristics evidenced by fraud or "oppression." An award
of exemplary damages cannot be based on mere speculation; it depends
instead on a definite showing of a willingness to vex, harass, or injure
consistent with a wrongful intent to injure. . .The wrongful personal
intention to injure is the factor that calls forth the penalty of exemplary
damages. Roth v. Shell Oil Co., 185 Cal. App. 2d 676,682,8 Cal. Rptr. 514,
517-18 (1960).
104. Cain v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 47 Cal. App. 3d at
893, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 206 (emphasis added) quoting from Note, Goodfaith and
Fair Dealing in Insurance Contracts:Gruenbergv. Aetna Insurance Co., 25
HASTINGS

L.J. 699, 714 (1974).

In the sentence immediately preceding the quoted portion, the court refers to
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The Cain court next found that State Farm showed a conscious disregard of the insured's rights when the company proceeded as it did knowing that its insured might be forced into
bankruptcy. 105

But it seems clear that a verdict in excess of the policy limits
automatically exposes the insured to a risk of financial loss. Even
if he has a cause of action against the insurance company for a
tortious breach, his p~tential liability continues until he proves
his claim or the insurance company voluntarily pays or settles
the excess. It is possible depending upon the assets of the insured
that this risk will result in severe financial hardship for the
insured, and may even force the insured into bankruptcy.
Absent a judicial determination of the tortious breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing the insured has
no right to have the excess paid by the insurance company. While
knowledge of the insurer that the insured may face financial
hardship if an excessive verdict is rendered is a factor in determining whether a breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing has occured, 10 6 the court fails to clearly disclose
how this knowledge may also lead to a determination of "conscious disregard"' 107 of the plaintiff's rights.

the holdings in Fletcher and Gruenberg. Fletcher was a 1st party action affirming liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress and an award of
punitive damages. Gruenberg was an appeal from a judgment of dismissal. The
court held that the insured's actions, under the facts of the case, were justified
and that the duty of good faith and fair dealing was absolute. The court reversed
and directed reinstatement of the complaint. Although Guenberg's complaint
asked for punitive damages, they were not in issue on the appeal.
Accepting the validity of the punitive damage award in Fletcherand assuming
the facts pled in Gruenberg were established and led to an award of punitive
damages, it is easily seen that "such actions will lead the insurer down the path of
exemplary damages." But compare these "actions" with the "actions" in Cain.
Additionally, mere breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing will
not support punitive damages, Silberg v. California Life Insurance Co., 11 Cal. 3d
at 462, 521 P.2d at 1110, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
By leaving the words such action without a clear antecedent, the reader is left
in doubt as to the future application of punitive damage principles in third party
excess cases.
105. Cain v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 47 Cal. App. 3d at
794, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 207.
106. Garner v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 31 Cal. App. 3d 843,107 Cal.
Rptr. 604 (1973).
107. See discussion n.8, supra and Beck v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co., 54 Cal. App. 3d 347, 126 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1976).

Finally the court found that State Farm demonstrated a conscious disregard of the insured's rights in that by refusing to pay
the excess verdict, State Farm created the possibility "that the
relationship between the insured and Miss Cain would be exposed, resulting in the possible termination of the insured's
108
marriage.'
The logical basis for this determination is the existence of a
duty on the part of the insurance company to protect the insured from such exposure. But the court's rationale for such a
conclusion is obscure. In the first place there is some question as
to whether an interest existed which could be protected. The
occurrence of a one-car accident involving both parties and the
filing of a suit by one party against the other would inevitably
result in a considerable exposure of the relationship. Moreover,
Mr. Jew's claim that Miss Cain was driving the car both highlighted the existence of some relationship between them and made
some investigation of that relationship necessary. 10 9
If the court had taken the position that the potential for such
exposure should be considered as a factor in deciding whether to
settle a claim before trial, much as the financial situation of the
insured is to be considered, the holding would be less confusing,
providing the court explained why such conduct rose to the level
of conscious disregard. However, in this case the court clearly
placed the issue within the context of a post judgment failure to
pay an excess verdict, thus adding to the confusion surrounding
the rationale for the holding.
One of the main factors contributing to the obfuscation in this
case is the almost total lack of reasoning or explanation presented by the opinion. Lacking such clarification and considering that the overriding purpose of allowing punitive damages is
to punish the defendant for conduct the law seeks to preclude,
one is left to ponder just what State Farm did which the law
108. 47 Cal. App. 3d at 794, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 207.
109. See the facts as discussed in Brief for Appellant, 2 and Brief for Respondent, 5-6, Cain v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 47 Cal. App. 3d
783, 121 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1975). From Mr. Jew's admissions it was clear that he told
the police officer that he and not Elaine Cain was driving the vehicle in an effort
to keep his relationship with Miss Cain from his wife. However, after being
informed that Miss Cain might die and that manslaughter charges might be
brought, his version of who was driving changed. Possibly his concern over
exposing the relationship varied with the potential liability he faced. In addition,
can it be said on the basis of the facts as disclosed in Cain,that State Farm acted
in conscious disregard of Mr. Jew's rights vis-a-vis this relationship given his own
shifting viewpoint towards exposure?
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found0 so objectionable that punitive damages were appropri11
ate.
Until the decision in Cain, the issue of punitive damages had
only been considered in first party cases. An examination of
these first party cases discloses extensive analysis by the courts
of the conduct which gave rise to punitive damages and establishes quite clearly that there exists a quantum differential between that conduct which will support a finding of a breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and that
conduct necessary to support an award of punitive damages."'
Further, study of these first party actions reveals that "outrageous" 112 conduct was a factor common to those insurers against
whom punitive damages were awarded, although such behavior
is not required to sustain an action for bad faith.
In Silberg v. California Life Insurance Company 113 the
California Supreme Court emphasized that the basic intent required for the imposition of punitive damages was that the
defendant must have acted with "intent to vex, injure, or114annoy,
or with a conscious disregard of the plaintiffs' rights."
Silberg makes it clear that a breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing will not, by itself, make imprudent
insurers liable for punitive damages. It is also well settled that a
finding of negligence, or even of gross negligence, is not sufficient to justify an award of punitive damages. 115 Therefore, a
finding that an insurer has acted with a conscious disregard for
the interests of the insured should include the requirement that
the insurer's conduct
was more than wrongful, in that it was
1 16
willful or wanton.

110. Compare the discussion on the issue of punitive damages in Cain,47 Cal.
App. 3d at 793-94, 121 Cal. Rptr. 206-07 with the cases cited note 111, infra.
111. See Silberg v. California Life Insurance Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452,521 P.2d 1103,
113 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1974); Neal v. Farmers Insurance Esch., 64 Cal. App. 3d 966, Cal. Rptr. - (1976); Beck v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 54 Cal.
App. 3d 347, 126 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1976); Richardson v. Employers Liab. Assur.
Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 232, 102 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1972); and Fletcher v. Western
National Life Insurance Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 90 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
112. Id.
113. 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974).
114. Id. at 462, 521 P.2d at 1110, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 718. See also n.8 supra.
115. Ebaugh v. Rabkin, 22 Cal. App. 3d 891, 894, 99 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1972).
116. See Farmy v. College Housing Inc., 48 Cal. App. 3d 166,176,121 Cal. Rptr.
658, 664 (1975).
Something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required

An examination of Beck v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co.1 7 lends further support to these principles. In

Beck the court of appeal reversed a judgment awarding punitive
damages. The insurer had unreasonably refused to negotiate or
settle an uninsured motorist claim. In affirming the judgment
concerning the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, the court characterized the insurer's position as
"patently untenable." 1 8 However, the court went on to point out
that such conduct was not sufficient to support an award of
punitive damages.
Thus, it does not follow that, because State Farm took an unreasonable
position on the validity of a defense to coverage under Beck's policy,
State Farm acted with intent to harm Beck . . .A State Farm claim
representative testified that he knew the withholding of benefits from
Beck might vex and oppress her; but that would be true of any insured.
The circumstances here do not permit an inference of actual malice or
oppression.119

When discussing the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, the courts have traditionally "borrowed" principles
from either first or third party cases;"a° even though these types
of actions are not identical in all respects. Although, conflicts of
interest may develop leading to a breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, the level of adversity that exists between
the insurance company and insured in first party cases is not
present in a third party case. Thus, it becomes quite critical to
clearly delineate that conduct by the insurance company which
can be said to support exemplary damages. This is Cain's most
glaring weakness. The opinion does not acknowledge that there
are differences between first and third party actions and a shifting relationship between the insurance company and the
insured.
In a first party action the contractual duty is one of indemnification, that is to return the insured 21 to the place he was prior to
the loss. The obligation under the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing associated with this contractual duty is generally refor punitive damages. There must be circumstances of aggravation or
outrage, such as spite or malice, or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part
of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the
interests of others that his conduct may be called wilful or wanton.
Prosser, W., The Law of Torts, 9-10 (4th Ed. 1971).
117. 54 Cal. App. 3d 347, 126 Cal. Rptr. 602 (1976).
118. Id. at 355, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
119. Id. at 356, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 607.
120. Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Company, 9 Cal. 3d 566,573,510 P.2d 1032,
1036, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 486 (1973).
121. Insured means the named insured or his selected beneficiary under the
policy.
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ferred to as the duty not to unreasonably withhold payments due
122
under the policy.
The policies usually involved in first party cases are property,
casualty and disability policies, where the insured himself has
suffered property damage or physical injury which is ostensibly
covered by the policy. The insurance company must evaluate the
policy with reference to the claim and the only issues generally
arising are whether the loss in fact occurred and whether the loss
is covered by the policy. Negligence on the part of the insured is
usually not a factor in resolving these questions.
In a first party action, true adversity may exist between the
insurance company and the insured when contracted for benefits are withheld. Within the context of this adversity, the actions of the insurance company which may be viewed as perpetrated with an intent to vex or injure or with a conscious disregard of the insured's rights are more readily perceived.
In a third party action the contractual duty of the insurance
company is to defend its insured and to pay those sums (up to the
policy limits) which the insured becomes legally obligated to pay.
The obligation under the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is usually defined as the duty to accept reasonable settlement offers.
The insurance policies seen in third party actions are liability
policies. The insured is usually alleged to have committed a tort
arising out of his negligent conduct. The issues generally presented are whether the policy provides the coverage claimed and
whether the insured actually committed the tort alleged.
It is possible that even after rejecting a settlement offer, which
admittedly may be a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, the insurance company can still carry out its contractual
obligation of defense and payment of the policy limits.
Previous third party cases have evaluated the conduct of insurance companies occurring between the act of the insured giving
rise to potential liability for him and the decision whether to
settle or litigate. 123 If, in the court's opinion, the conduct which
122. See note 7, supra.
123. See Johansen v. California State Auto. Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau, 14 Cal.
3d 9,538 P.2d 744,123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975); Garner v. American Mut. Liability Ins.
Co., 31 Cal. App. 3d 943, 107 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1973); Crisci v. Security Insurance Co.

supports an award of punitive damages occurs prior to the
decision to litigate, the court should be extremely careful to
delineate just how the activity giving rise to punitive damages
differs from that which led to the breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. Obscurity in this analysis invites
the inference that the court is willing to accept the proposition
that mere breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing will lead to punitive damages. A proposition which is in
conflict with Silberg and the general purpose of punitive
124
damages.
If the award of punitive damages, based on a conscious disregard of the insured's rights, is to be upheld by concentrating on
conduct which occurs after the excess verdict, the court should
carefully define the obligations of the insurer to the insured,
consider the level of adversity existing between the parties and
analyze the conduct of the insurer with a view toward demonstrating circumstances which "permit an inference of actual
malice or oppression."
Judged by these criteria, the decision in Cain provides an
unsatisfactory analysis of State Farm's conduct with regard to
liability for punitive damages. The disquieting feature of Cain is
that one cannot determine with any degree of certainty the type
of conduct on the part of an insurance company which will make
it liable for punitive damages in future cases involving excess
liability.
CONCLUSION

A negligent tortfeasor without insurance is exposed to liability
to the full range of his assets; however, he retains full control
over the decision whether to settle or litigate. In obtaining a
liability insurance policy he obtains a measure of protection for
his assets. However, the insurance company demands complete
control over the investigation, settlement and litigation processes as a quid pro quo for this protection. The courts, in response, have reasoned that the expectations of the individual
policy holders include a belief that upon receipt of a reasonable
demand a claim will be settled within policy limits. When viewed
from the position of the insured this expectation has merit.
For the benefit of the policyholders as a group a delicate
balance must be struck between upholding the reasonable expectations of the individual policyholders and the preservation
of the claim fund from unfounded claims.
of New Haven Conn., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967); and
Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 3d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
124. See note 111 supra.
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. . [I]n the distribution of the fund, the principle of solidity is merely
one of a pair of goals which contend with each other in precarious
*

balance. In distributing the fund, a task supervised by the courts, the
need to preserve the fund against unreasonable claims which threaten
its existence must continually be weighed against the aim of ensuring
that policyholders' reasonable expectations are fulfilled.'2 5

In the traditional treatment given excess liability cases the
bifurcated obligations of an insurance company have tended to
be obscured. While the concern for the claim fund is seldom an
explicit consideration in reaching a settlement decision in a
particular case, this factor does influence the procedures the
insurance company establishes to assure itself that the claim is
warranted.
The law in California has not yet been expanded so as to
impose strict liability on insurers for refusing to accept "reasonable" settlement offers within policy limits. However, a review of
excess liability cases reveals that the application of the current
test of bad faith leads to nearly certain recovery of the excess
where the insurance company has rejected a "reasonable: settlement offer. The apparent ease with which the Cain decision
affirmed the award of emotional distress and punitive damages
postulates another step toward the practical impositon of strict
liability. Unquestionably the threat of large emotional distress
and punitive damage recoveries will provide an added impetus
for the insurance companies to settle. If strict liability in law does
not exist, something virtually undistinguishable from it exists in
practice.
The California approach to the question of liability for excess
judgments, founded upon bad faith, leaves some serious
concerns.
1. Under the current system of liability based upon fault, where a
dispute exists as to coverage, liability or damages what may an
insurance company in good faith consider to justify its defending an

action and
still not be held liable for any excess judgment that may
26
result?
2. To what extent may an insurance company seek to protect the
insurance claim fund against apparently unwarranted claims? The
125. S. Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A PreliminaryInquiry in the Theory of InsuranceLaw, in Essays in Insurance Regulation at 4-5
(1966).
126. See, Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 858,873-77, 110 Cal. Rptr.
511, 517-21 (1973) for a discussion of the dilemma an insurance company faces
when it undertakes the settlement/litigation decision.

current test used in excess liability cases is framed in terms of "equal
consideration", implying
that the insurance company has some
127
legitimate interest.

In Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. the California Supreme
Court indicated its hospitality to imposing strict liability in the

proper case. 128 Strict libility also presents some concerns relating
to the efficacy of this approach in serving the interests of all
parties involved in a claim settlement question.
1. Would adoption
of strict liability result in increased or reduced
29
litigation?1
2. Under the strict liability test considered in Crisci,should liability be
predicated upon a "reasonable" settlement offer. If so, how should a
"reasonable" settlement offer be determined? Does the current "in30
ference instruction" provide the necessary insight?

Under either approach, other concerns are presented.
1. What impact does comparative negligence have on the determina3
tion to accept reasonable settlement offers?' '
2. What function should liability insurance serve in society? Where is
127. Id.
128. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 430-31, 426 P.2d 173, 177-78, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 17 (1967).
129. Admittedly, adopting a rule of strict liability would remove, in most
cases, the second lawsuit founded on bad faith, wherein recovery of the excess
would be sought. This approach would also remove the potential for emotional
distress and punitive damages. However, the insurance company's decision
whether to litigate a claim tends to be made with one eye on its evaluation of the
insured's liability and the other on the costs involved, which include potential
liability for any excess, damages for emotional distress and punitive damages. If
two of these factors are removed from the decisional equation, will the numbers
of claims litigated move up or down from the current point?
130. Under strict liability the offer necessary to trigger strict liability is
generally defined as one capable of acceptance. In Coe v. State Farm Mutual
Auto Ins. Co. (1st Dist., Civ. No. 37977, decided Feb. 9, 1977), the insurance
company was confronted with a demand for the policy limits, an offer which
might have been construed as "being capable of acceptance." However, the
settlement offer did not include a release of another insurance carrier who had a
right of recoupment. Acceptance of this settlment offer would have left the
insured exposed to this recoupment action, so the insurance company rejected
the offer. The trial resulted in an excess verdict and the insurance company was
sued for this excess. The court of appeal determined that it cannot be unreasonable to reject an offer that it would be unreasonable to accept.
131.. American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. App. 3d 694, 704,
135 Cal. Rptr. 497, 503 (1977), concerned the right of a named defendant to bring
persons not named into the action as defendants. The court held:
[Tlhat the adoption of the rule of pure comparative negligence in Li
abrogates the pre-existing rule of joint and several liability of concurrent tortfeasors. Where the Li rule applies, liability among concurrent
tortfeasors must be apportioned according to their respective degrees of
negligence with each liable to the plaintiff only for his proportion
(emphasis added).
Insurance company responsibility for excess verdicts is theoretically sound
under a system of joint and several liability. For, absent a finding of contributory
negligence, the insured defendant can be liable for the full extent of the judgment, irrespective of his proportionate degree of fault.
How should the insurance company approach a settlement conflict under the
rule of American Motorcycle?
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the balance properly struck between providing maximum and timely compensation to injured parties and providing protection to indi-

vidual policy holders at a cost which the maximum number of
insurance consumers can afford?

3. If one concludes that the social function of liability insurance is to
compensate victims, rather than to protect the insured, does "no
fault insurance" provide a better solution?

Insurance carriers charge a premium for exposure before the
actual losses are determined. Past experience enables a company to establish rates that will be reasonably accurate and
reliable through the use of the "law of large numbers." Once the
rate is established in relation to the risk, an additional amount is
included to provide for expenses and profit.
Through this method of rating and providing coverage virtually any exposure to loss can be insured. However, as the probability of loss increases in relation to the coverage provided, or as the
policy is expanded to cover losses from other risks, the policy
must become more expensive. The result is a socialization of the
"risk." The key to insurance coverage is to provide the most
comprehensive coverage possible to the public while keeping the
premium affordable. The net result for the policy holders as a
group will be a socialization of the risk for which a price will have
to be paid by each individual policy holder in the form of increased premiums.
Virtually all negligence law involves a decision on the extent of loss
shifting from the plaintiff to someone else, and generally from that
someone to still others. Where, as in California, tort law is imbedded in
the concept of socialization of loss; the "others" are taxpayers, consumers, or purchasers of insurance ...

The policy choice must thus be made in light of the social costs
involved.132

ROGER D. MARLOW
RONALD E. MAGNUSON
132. American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. App. 3d 702, 135
Cal. Rptr. 502 (1977).

